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1.1 The Topic 
 
Throughout the last decade, the use of targeted killings as part of States’ counterterrorism 
strategy has increased heavily. Today, numerous Governments have acknowledged, either 
implicit or explicit, that they have resorted to targeted killings as a method of counter-
terrorism.1 The United States (hereinafter: US) has frequently used this tactic to fight terror-
ism in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.2 After the attacks of 9/11, targeted 
killings became one of the US’ main countermeasure strategies. Under the Obama Admini-
stration, the use of targeted killings has further expanded, mostly though the increase of un-
manned drone strikes against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.3 Some examples on this tendency are 
the killings of Osama bin Laden in a US Navy SEAL raid and the drone strike on Anwar al-
Awlaki, both in 2011.4 Furthermore, Israel has openly employed this strategy to terrorist 
threats and has exercised targeted killings both in its operations against Palestinian suicide 
bombers and against missile launchers.5  In addition, other nations such as Russia and Sri 
Lanka have also employed this practice during the last decade.6 
 
Even though the use of targeted killings has become a widespread tactic, despite the fre-
quency in witch it is invoked, it is still a controversial topic and the legality of these targeted 
killings remain disputed.7 In addition, this counterterrorism-strategy does not fit comfortably 
into any particular legal regime8, as will be shown in this thesis. Hence, the criteria for the 
permissibility of targeted killings are vague and still in question.9 Some academics, military 
personnel and officials view targeted killings as permissible within a situation of self-defense, 
when employed against terrorists or combatants engaged in asymmetrical warfare.10 While 
other academics, twenty-six members of the US Congress11 and civil rights groups like the 
                                                
1 Melzer (2008), p. 9 
2 Masters (2013) 
3 Masters (2013) 
4 Masters (2013) 
5 Falk (2014), p. 295 
6 Falk (2014), p. 295 
7 Perdikaris (2014), p. 113 
8 UN Human Rights Council (2010), para. 7 
9 Perisic (2014), p. 100 
10 Perdikaris (2014), p. 113 
11 Glaser (2012) 
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American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)12 have criticized targeted killings as similar to assas-
sinations or extrajudicial killings, which are illegal under international law.13  
 
Whether a specific targeted killing is lawful depends on the circumstances in which the opera-
tion is carried out. In other words, the legality depends on the legal regime applicable to the 
targeted killing, which again depends on the context in which a targeted killing takes place. Is 
it a matter of international human rights law or is it an act of war, triggering the rules of inter-
national humanitarian law? If the targeted killing is an act of war, the question is whether the 
targeted killing is considered as an act of self-defense from the jus ad bellum perspective, and, 
more importantly from the jus in bello perspective, is the targeted individual (the terrorist) 
considered to be a combatant, a civilian, or neither?14 This thesis will attempt to identify un-
der which conditions targeted killings are considered legally permissible, not whether a spe-




1.2 Defining the Term “Targeted Killing” 
 
The term ”targeted killing” does not have a formal definition under international law. Accord-
ing to the UN Human Rights Council report on the study of targeted killings dated May 28, 
2010, a targeted killing is “the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by 
States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized group in armed conflict, 
against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator.”15 
 
Dr. Nils Melzer, a Legal Advisor for the International Committee of the Red Cross, agrees 
with the definition set out in the UN Special Report in his book “Targeted Killing in Interna-
tional Law”16. According to Melzer, there are five cumulative requirements to what is under-
stood as a “targeted killing”.17 First, there must be use of lethal force. The particular act of 
lethal force varies widely, from drone strikes to special operation raids. Secondly, a targeted 
killing includes the elements of intent, premeditation and deliberation to kill. These elements 
require that the operation is carried out with the intent to kill the targeted individual, that this 
intent is based on a conscious choice, and that the deprivation of the targeted persons life is 
                                                
12 Shamsi (2014) 
13 Perdikaris (2014), p. 113 
14 Perisic (2014), p. 100 
15 UN Human Rights Council (2010), para. 1 
16 Melzer (2008) 
17 Melzer (2008), p. 3 
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the aim of the operation. Thirdly, there is a requirement of targeting individually selected per-
sons. Fourthly, the person targeted is not in physical custody of those targeting him. Lastly, 
targeted killings must be attributable to a subject of international law. Such subjects are 
mainly States, but may also include non-State actors.18 In sum: 
“The term ‘targeted killing’ denotes the use of lethal force attributable to a subject of interna-
tional law with the intent, premeditation and deliberation to kill individually selected persons 
who are not in the physical custody of those targeting them”.19 
 
1.3 Legal Sources 
 
1.3.1 In the Context of Armed Conflict 
 
International humanitarian law (IHL), also known as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), is a 
body of international law, which regulates the conduct of belligerents during armed conflict. 
These rules, also called the jus in bello, applies with equal force to all belligerents and is irre-
spective of whether the resort to use of force itself is lawful according to the jus ad bellum.20 
International humanitarian law comprises those rules of international law that regulate the 
treatment of mainly persons and objects within the context of armed conflicts.21 The main 
legal instruments dealing with the conduct of hostilities are the four Geneva Conventions of 
1949 (GCs) and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions adopted in 1977 (API 
and APII). The four Geneva Conventions have been universally ratified and are thus interna-
tionally binding upon all states.22 In addition, international human rights law protects all hu-
man beings at all times, including in a situation of armed conflict.23 Hence, in the context of 
an armed conflict, both international humanitarian law and human rights law apply, see chap-
ter 2.1.  
 
IHL’s objective is to limit the effects of armed conflict, through rules that protect persons who 
do not participate or are no longer participating in the hostilities and through rules limiting the 
means and methods of conducting hostilities.24 In addition, customary international law plays 
an important role in the formation of IHL. Not all major treaties in this area of law enjoy uni-
versal adherence, and in those situations where treaties or other provisions does not apply to a 
                                                
18 Melzer (2008), pp. 3-5 
19 Melzer (2008), p. 5. 
20 Duffy (2005), p. 217 
21 Fleck (2013), p. 11 
22 Fleck (2013), p. 26 
23 Melzer (2008), p. 58 
24 MacLaren (2005), p. 1218 
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conflict or leaves gaps in the application, customary law may meddle.25 Customary interna-
tional law is especially significant when the parties to the conflict have not ratified the par-
ticular treaty or if the customary rule is wider and more comprehensive than the conventional 
rule. The customary rule is binding in both these situations. 
 
The greater part of the provisions found in the four Geneva Conventions, including Common 
Article 3, are considered customary international law.26 Additional Protocol I, applicable in 
international armed conflicts, both codified existing customary international law and laid the 
groundwork for new customary rules to arise.27 The ICRC Study on Customary International 
Law found that the key principles of API have been broadly accepted, and that API have had 
an extensive effect on the practice of States in both international and non-international armed 
conflicts.28 In addition, APII, applicable in non-international armed conflicts, influenced this 
practice, and several of its provisions are today considered customary rules of international 
law.29 Nevertheless, the customary rules applicable to non-international armed conflicts are 
far more detailed than the rather basic provisions of APII. In order to fill the many gaps in the 
regulation of hostilities in NIACs, State practice has led to the creation of rules similar to 
those found in API, thus expanding the rules applicable to non-international armed conflicts 
as customary international law.30 Furthermore, these customary rules of IHL binds not only 
States but also non-State actors (armed groups), who cannot be party to the IHL treaties.31 
Hence, members of non-State organized armed groups must obey the customary rules appli-
cable in non-international armed conflicts.32  
 
In contrast to treaties, which are always binding on the parties to a treaty, non-legally binding 
soft law instruments used in contemporary international relations by States and international 
organizations may be evidence of existing law or it may be decisive of the opinio juris and/or 
State practice, which creates customary law.33 The legal effect of such non-binding declara-
tions, resolutions, studies, and guidelines, etc., is not automatically the same even though they 
                                                
25 MacLaren (2005), p. 1220 
26 Henckaerts, ICRC Study on costumary international law: A contribution to the understanding and respect for 
the rule of law in armed conflict (2005), p. 187 
27 Fleck (2013), pp. 28 and 29 
28 Henckaerts, ICRC Study on costumary international law: A contribution to the understanding and respect for 
the rule of law in armed conflict (2005), p. 187 
29 Henckaerts, ICRC Study on costumary international law: A contribution to the understanding and respect for 
the rule of law in armed conflict (2005), p. 188 
30 Henckaerts, ICRC Study on costumary international law: A contribution to the understanding and respect for 
the rule of law in armed conflict (2005), p. 189 
31 MacLaren (2005), p. 1221 
32 Fleck (2013), p. 30 
33 Evans (2014), p. 118 
5 
 
are considered soft law. Nevertheless, these are more often than not carefully negotiated and 
drafted statements, often with the ambition to have normative significance and with an aspira-
tion to influence States practice or to communicate a law-making intention and continuous 
development.34 
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law35 by Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck in 2005 contains 
an exceptionally thorough study on the practice of States and non-State actors within the con-
text of IHL. The authors have assembled and analyzed a substantial amount of material, and 
the Study presents a collection of customary rules of IHL. Hence, the objective of ICRC’s 
Study is to identify those rules that are already binding on all States within the notion of an 
armed conflict. 
 
Even though the Study defines and documents customary IHL in a comprehensive manner, it 
has been subject to criticism, mostly by the US. The US states that the Study frequently fails 
to apply an appropriate approach to assessing State practice.36 However, in this area of inter-
national law, States practice and opinion may be challenging to ascertain. Further, the US 
holds that the basis for the Study is inadequate and that it relies in too large extent on military 
manuals and non-binding resolutions by the UN General Assembly, as well as statements by 
other NGOs and by ICRC itself, giving them undue legal weight.37 Even further, the US 
shows concern about the approach to the requirement of opinio juris and, in addition, the US 
holds that the Study have a tendency to simplify complex and nuanced rules.38  
 
Nevertheless, the ICRC is a neutral and independent institution with a strict policy on objec-
tivity and discretion.39 Hence, the ICRC Study contains a systematic, detailed and impartial 
analysis of the conventional rules of IHL combined with States practice, which is in no doubt 
relevant when assessing the customary rules of IHL. Further, ICRC has an authoritative status 
in international humanitarian law due to the prerogatives given them in GCIII art. 126 and 
GCIV art. 143. Article 142 of GCIV also strengthens this view by recognizing ICRC’s special 
position. Even further, the ICRC was granted observer status40 at the United Nations in Octo-
                                                
34 Evans (2014), p. 120 
35 Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law (2005) 
36 U.S. Department of State (2006), para. State Practice 
37 U.S. Department of State (2006), para. Opinio juris 
38 U.S. Department of State (2006), para. Formation of rules 
39 ICRC, Mandate and Mission 
40 UN Charter art. 71 
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ber 1990.41 This shows that the ICRC has gained a substantial amount of significant knowl-
edge and authority within the field of international humanitarian law. Governments, the 
United Nations and other organizations extensively recognize the privileges and immunities 
of the ICRC, hence, acknowledging their respect for the key principles of the ICRC; imparti-
ality, independence and neutrality.42 Therefore, although the Study is not binding, the Study is 
directly relevant and provides a broad and objective analysis on the customary rules of armed 
conflict. 
 
1.3.2 Outside the Context of Armed Conflict 
 
Targeted killings conducted for purposes other than the conduct of hostilities or occurring 
outside the context of an armed conflict, are governed by human rights law, in particular those 
rules governing the use of lethal force.43 These human rights standards may also be known as 
the “law enforcement” paradigm.44 The main legal instruments in this regard are the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR) and the European Convention 
on Human Rights of 1950 (ECHR).  
 
International Human Rights Law (IHRL) protects all human beings at all times.45 Outside the 
scope of armed conflict, IHL is not engaged and the permissibility of a targeted killing is thus 
narrower than in an armed conflict.46  
 
Whilst IHL is only applicable in the existence of an armed conflict, human rights treaties re-
quire the existence of jurisdiction.47 The territorial scope of application of the ECHR is gov-
erned by its Article 1, which reads: “The […] Parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.” The applicability 
therefore depends on the interpretation on the notion “jurisdiction”. The UN Human Rights 
Committee (UNHRC) specified in the Burgos Case that the term “jurisdiction” in ICCPR does 
not refer to the place a violation takes places, “but rather to the relationship between the 
individual and the State in relation to a violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant, 
wherever they occurred”.48 This approach was confirmed by the UNHRC in its General 
                                                
41 Koenig (1991) 
42 Gabor (2004) 
43 UN Human Rights Council (2010), para. 31 
44 UN Human Rights Council (2010), para. 31 
45 Melzer (2008), p. 58 
46 MacDonald (2011), p. 128 
47 Melzer (2008), p. 76 
48 UNHRC, Burgos Case, para 12; Melzer (2008) p. 124 
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Comment No. 31: “…a State Party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Cove-
nant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated 
within the territory of the State Party. […] This principle also applies to those within the 
power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless 
of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained…”.49 In this 
Comment the Human Rights Committee focus on the relationship between the individual and 
the State, confirming the potential of extraterritorial application of the conventional obliga-
tions.50  
 
There has been conflicting case law on the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction of ECHR. 
There are two main elements of jurisprudence on the interpretation of “extraterritorial juris-
diction”.51 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have decided their cases based on 
the model of “effective control”; a state possesses jurisdiction whenever it has effective over-
all control of an area, and on the personal model of jurisdiction (“state agent authority”); a 
state has jurisdiction whenever it exercises authority or control over an individual.52  
 
In light of the limited jurisdictional scope of application in Article 1, the ECtHR attempted to 
provide clarification in Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others, in 2011. In the Bankovic 
Case the Court found that the notion of “jurisdiction” under the ECHR is “essentially” territo-
rial, thus within the State’s own territory.53 Any extension of jurisdiction beyond the State’s 
territory is “exceptional” and requires “special justification” in the particular circumstances of 
each case.54 ECtHR clarified that the Courts “recognition of the existence of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction by a Contracting State is exceptional: it has done so when the respondent State, 
through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a conse-
quence of military occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Gov-
ernment of that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised 
by that Government.”55   
 
In Bankovic, the Court found that individuals killed outside an area under the effective overall 
control of a state by missiles or bombs fired from an aircraft were not within the state’s juris-
                                                
49 UNHRC, General Comment No. 31 (2004), para. 10 
50 Melzer (2008), p. 125 
51 Milanovic (2012), p. 122 
52 Milanovic (2012), p. 122 
53 Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others, para. 59-61 
54 Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others, para. 59-61 
55 Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others, para. 71 
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diction, and that such control generally requires troops on the ground.56 Hence, control over 
airspace and a ‘mere’ power to kill were not sufficient to extend the jurisdiction.57 The Court 
essentially ignored the personal model in the Bankovic case, and ultimately, “any act capable 
of violating a person’s human rights would seem to amount to an exercise of ‘authority and 
control’ over that individual”.58 However, the necessary implication of its ruling was that the 
power to kill alone could not constitute ‘authority and control’.  
 
On July 7 2011, the ECtHR issued a judgment on the extraterritorial application of the ECHR 
in the case of Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom. The Court first outlined the two main strands of 
the case law, one based on a personal and the other on a spatial notion of jurisdiction. First, 
the Court “recognized the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State 
when, through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, it 
exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government. […] 
Thus where, in accordance with custom, treaty or other agreement, authorities of the Contract-
ing State carry out executive or judicial functions on the territory of another State, the Con-
tracting State may be responsible for breaches of the Convention thereby incurred, as long as 
the acts in question are attributable to it rather than to the territorial State.”59  
 
Further, the Court recalls that case law have demonstrated that, in certain circumstances, the 
use of force by a State’s agents operating outside its territory may bring the individual thereby 
brought under the control of the State’s authorities and hence, into the State’s jurisdiction 
within the meaning of Article 1.60 The Court then emphasizes that the decisive point in such 
cases is the exercise of physical power and control over the person in question.61 Whenever 
the State through its agents exercises such control and authority over an individual, Article 1 
requires the State to secure to that individual the rights and freedoms under Section 1 of the 
Convention that are relevant to the situation of that individual.62 However, as pointed out by 
Milanovic, having the power to kill a person, whether by a drone or rifle, is indeed an exercise 
of “physical power” over that individual.63 This contradicts the statement made by the Court 
in Bankovic, namely that the ‘mere’ power to kill does not equate jurisdiction.64 Nevertheless, 
                                                
56 Milanovic (2012), p. 123 
57 Milanovic (2012), p. 123 
58 Milanovic (2012), p. 123 
59 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, para. 135 
60 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, para. 136 
61 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, para. 136 
62 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, para. 137 
63 Milanovic (2012), p. 129 
64 Milanovic (2012), p. 129 
9 
 
the foundation remains, namely that the extraterritorial application of ECHR can only be ex-
ceptional and needs to be justified by reference to general international law.65 
 
Hence, the notion of “jurisdiction” has both a territorial and personal dimension, and the ap-
plication of IHRL is in fact subject to restrictions.66 As to targeted killings taking place out-
side the targeting State’s territory, the targeted person is brought within the jurisdiction of the 
operating State, if that State exercises sufficient factual control. More precisely, in Melzer’s 
words: “a State exercising sufficient factual control or power to carry out a targeted killing 
will also exercise sufficient factual control to assume legal responsibility for its failure to ‘re-
spect’ the right to life of the targeted person under conventional human rights law”.67 
 
In conclusion, when a State executes a targeted killing of an individual, e.g. drops a bomb on 
the targeted person, it may not have “effective control” over that area. However, it will most 
likely have “state agent authority and control”, bringing the individual into the jurisdiction of 
the targeting State. The result is that the targeting State is required secure to that individual 
the rights and freedoms provided under Section 1 of ECHR, comprising the right to not be 




This thesis will attempt to address the legal questions regarding the use of targeted killing as 
part of States counterterrorism strategy. I will first address the question concerning the appli-
cable law and look closer at the relationship between the two bodies of law and between the 
rules applicable in NIAC/IAC (chapter 2). Chapter 3 addresses the legality of targeted killings 
under international humanitarian law (IHL). In chapter 4 I will look at the permissibility of 
targeted killings as part of self-defense. Finally, chapter 5 addresses the legality of targeted 
killings under international human rights law (IHRL). Chapter 6 provides a conclusion.  
 
2 Which Legal Regime Properly Applies to Targeted Killings? 
 
2.1 Introduction: Two International Bodies of Law 
 
                                                
65 Milanovic (2012), p. 129 
66 Melzer (2008), p. 135 
67 Melzer (2008), pp. 138-139 
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Two branches of international law govern States use of deadly force, namely human rights 
law and international humanitarian law.68 The application of IHL relies on the existence of an 
armed conflict, while IHRL is applicable at all times, both in an armed conflict and in times of 
peace. Hence, the relationship between these two legal regimes is complicated and complex.69  
 
The ICJ has recognized three circumstances in which the two bodies of law interact. In the 
2004 Wall Advisory Opinion, paragraph 106, the Court states the following: “some rights 
may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively mat-
ters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international 
law.”70 However, the Court did not specify how they interact when applied simultaneously.71  
 
The applicability of international human rights law during armed conflicts was addressed by 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.72 In the Advisory Opinion paragraph 25 the Court states 
that “the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not cease 
in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions 
may be derogated from in a time of national emergency.”73 The Court further states that “the 
right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is 
an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex spe-
cialis”.74 Hence, the individual’s right to life continues to be protected even in the context of 
an armed conflict, but the lex specialis of IHL is triggered and the lawfulness of the targeted 
killing must be assessed against that body of law.75 However, in the event that IHL does not 
provide a rule, or the rule is ambiguous, it may be appropriate to draw guidance from human 
rights law.76 Hence, the view today is that human rights law is applicable at all times every-
where and that humanitarian law is lex specialis applying only in time of war and thus par-
tially supersedes human rights law in the event of an armed conflict.77  
 
                                                
68 MacDonald (2011) 
69 Siatitsa (2011) 
70 ICJ Wall, Advisory Opinion (2004), para. 106 
71 Siatitsa (2011) 
72 ICJ Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (1996) 
73 ICJ Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (1996), para. 25 
74 ICJ Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (1996), para. 25 
75 MacDonald (2011), p. 128 
76 UN Human Rights Council (2010), para. 29 
77 Brennan (2013) 
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In the Wall Advisory Opinion, the ICJ affirms this view and holds that “the protection offered 
by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict”78 and further, that “the 
Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of international law.”79 In other 
words, unless there is a conflict between them, these two branches of law apply coextensively 
and simultaneously. Hence, in situations of conflicting provisions, the specific rules of IHL 
prevail over the general rules of IHRL. 
 
The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur followed this approach in a report to the 
United Nations Secretary-General: “For example, they both aim to protect human life and 
dignity, prohibit discrimination on various grounds, and protect against torture or other cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment. ...The difference lies in that whilst human rights law pro-
tects the individual at all times, international humanitarian law is the lex specialis which ap-
plies only in situations of armed conflict.”80 
 
The UN Human Rights Committee has a somewhat different approach to the relationship be-
tween IHL and IHRL, avoiding the term lex specialis. According to their complementary and 
harmonious approach, the two branches of law, with the common objective of protecting per-
sons, should be interpreted in a way that seek compliance and harmony, rather than choosing 
one branch.81 
 
The question at hand is which law properly applies to the targeted killings of suspected terror-
ists. The problem with the dispute over the legality of targeted killings is that it does not fit 
into either of the two models.82 At the time the Geneva Conventions were written, the drafters 
did not take into consideration the new challenges that the modern world would bring upon 
us.83 Contemporary conflicts are very different from the conflicts and hostilities envisioned at 
that time. Modern day hostilities have resulted in new military tactics to address the new 
complications. Hence, these modern conflicts, like the “War on Terror” between states and 
non-state actors, have resulted in the controversial use of targeted killings and following legal 
challenges. Nevertheless, until new international norms are developed to address the chal-
lenges of the modern world, the legality of targeted killings must be assessed against the ex-
                                                
78 ICJ Wall, Advisory Opinion, para. 106 
79 ICJ Wall, Advisory Opinion, para. 106 
80 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfu (2005), para. 143 
81 Siatitsa (2011) 
82 MacDonald (2011), para. II  
83 Brennan (2013), pp. 1-2 
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isting legal regimes.84 Furthermore, within IHL, a distinction is made between two types of 
armed conflict, with a somewhat different set of rules applicable, see chapter 2.2 below.  
 
In conclusion, the answer to which legal regime applies to targeted killings depends on the 
circumstances and the conditions in which it takes place. More precisely, the rules of IHRL 
are applicable at all times; the question is whether the rules of IHL come into play. Hence, the 
answer to which body of law applies to a certain targeted killing depends on whether it takes 
place within an armed conflict or whether the killing is committed in peacetime.  
 
Is the War on Terror an “armed conflict”, which must be addressed primarily by International 
Humanitarian Law, or does it not constitute an “armed conflict” rendering the legality of tar-
geted killings to be addressed solely by International Human Rights Law? 
 
2.2 Classification of Conflicts; IACs and NIACs 
 
IHL applies in time of armed conflict, and, irrespective of the legality of the conflict (jus ad 
bellum), regulates what the parties to an armed conflict may and may not do.85 The rules of 
IHL distinguish between two categories of armed conflict: international armed conflict (IAC) 
and non-international armed conflict (NIAC).86 The distinction is based on the parties to the 
conflict.87 Even though the legal body governing the rules of armed conflict has evolved, with 
a considerable body of both treaty rules and customary rules now applicable in both types of 
armed conflict, essential differences remain.88 In this chapter, I will address the criteria for the 
existence of an armed conflict, the difference between the two generic types of armed conflict 
and which rules are applicable to them, and lastly, which rules of IHL applies to the “War on 
Terror”. 
 
2.2.1 “Armed Conflict”  
 
The term “armed conflict” is not defined in any IHL treaties, thus it remains to determine 
what is meant by “armed conflict”.89 The former term “war” was deliberately substituted by 
“armed conflict” in order to prevent States from resorting to force without recognizing the 
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hostilities as “war”.90 However, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), a court of law established by the United Nations for dealing with war crimes that 
occur during the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990’s91, has provided a definition. The Tri-
bunal formulated the following definition in the Tadic case: “An armed conflict exists when-
ever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a 
state”.92  
 
There are two types of armed conflict within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions; inter-
national and non-international armed conflicts. An international armed conflict exists when 
one State resorts to the use of force against another State, irrespective of duration or inten-
sity.93 According to the ICRC Commentary to Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, 
the occurrence of de facto hostilities between States is sufficient for the establishment of an 
international armed conflict.94 A non-international armed conflict exists when there is a situa-
tion of protracted armed violence between a State and organized armed groups or between 
such groups within a state.95 Two basic criteria must be met in order to characterize a situation 
as a non-international armed conflict. The first requirement is that the violence must be of 
sufficient intensity. As opposed to international armed conflicts, the armed violence in a non-
international armed conflict must reach a certain threshold to exclude other situations of inter-
nal disturbances and tensions or sporadic violence, which fall outside the scope of IHL and 
are governed by law enforcement. The second requirement is that the parties to the non-
international armed conflict must be sufficiently organized.96 
 
Hence, the question of whether or not an armed conflict is established will depend on a factual 
assessment and, in case of a non-international armed conflict, whether or not these facts sat-
isfy the threshold. The vital characteristic of any armed conflict, international or non-
international, is the resort to force by two or more identifiable parties97. 
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2.2.2 International Armed Conflict (IAC) 
 
In this chapter I will discuss the definition of the term “international armed conflict”. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) presented in an opinion paper in March 
2008, “How is the term “armed conflict” defined in international humanitarian law?”, the pre-
vailing legal opinion on the definition of “international armed conflict” (IAC) under interna-
tional humanitarian law. In the Opinion Paper the ICRC interpret Common Article 2 (1), 
which reads: 
 
“In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Conven-
tion shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise 
between two or more High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by 
one of them.”98 
 
IACs are conflicts between states. The existence of an IAC depends on what actually happens 
on the ground, and there is no requirement to formally declare war.99 Hence, when deciding 
whether International Humanitarian law shall apply to a situation, one has to base the assess-
ment on the factual conditions independent of the subjective view of the parties. In the Com-
mentary to Common Article 2 of the Geneva Convention, the ICRC holds that “any difference 
arising between two States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces is 
an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the parties denies the exis-
tence of a state of war.”100 Hence, rules of IHL may apply even in the absence of open hostili-
ties, as the existence of an IAC is regardless of the reasons or the intensity of the confronta-
tion. In the words of the ICRC: “It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how 
much slaughter takes place.”101 The International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
proposed a general definition of the term international armed conflict in the Tadic case. IC-
TYs definition in that case, which later has been adopted by several other international bodies, 
is that “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States”.102 
 
Based on the analysis set out in the Opinion Paper, ICRCs proposes a definition of an interna-
tional armed conflict, which reflect the strong prevailing legal opinion: “International armed 
conflicts exist whenever there is resort to armed force between two or more states”.103 
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2.2.3 Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC) 
 
In the following I will discuss the term “non-international armed conflict”. The parties to a 
non-international armed conflict may either be governmental authorities and organized non-
governmental armed groups, or two or more such armed groups. The non-State actors party to 
a NIAC must be capable of identification as a party and must attain a certain extent of internal 
organization.104 Further, the hostilities must reach a certain threshold. Some relevant factors to 
the factual assessment of a NIAC are “the nature, intensity and duration of the violence, and 
the nature and organization of the parties.”105  
 
2.2.3.1 Application of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
 
Common Article 3 applies to “the case of armed conflicts not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties”. This definition does not 
require that armed groups are fighting against a government, rather the hostilities may occur 
either between governmental armed forces and non-governmental armed forces, or it may 
occur between two or more non-governmental armed groups.106 Today the Geneva Conven-
tions have all been ratified universally. Hence, there is no longer need for the requirement that 
the armed conflict must take place “in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties”, as 
this will always be the case. The threshold for the scope of application of Common Article 3 
is not further specified in the provision. The current understanding of this threshold is that it 
might be lower today than what was intended during the negotiations of the Geneva Conven-
tions in 1949. Due to the purpose of the article it was deliberately limited to contain a few 
minimum rules, which should receive the widest scope of application.107 
 
For the classification of a situation as a non-international armed conflict, the conflict must 
reach a certain threshold of confrontation. As opposed to international armed conflicts where 
the existence is irrespective of duration or intensity, factors relevant when assessing the fac-
tual determination of a non-international armed conflict include the nature, intensity and dura-
tion of the violence, and also the nature and organization of the parties108. With this threshold, 
the existence of an armed conflict is distinguished from lesser forms of violence, such as in-
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ternal disturbances and tensions, riots or acts of banditry. The ICRC states in its Opinion Pa-
per that it has been “generally accepted that the lower threshold found in art. 1 (2) of APII, 
which excludes internal disturbances and tensions from the definition of NIAC, also applies to 
common article 3.”109 
 
Thus, there are two criteria that must be met in this regard.110 The first criterion is that the 
hostilities must reach a minimum level of intensity. The second criterion that must be met in 
order to consider the situation as a NIAC is that the non-governmental groups involved in the 
conflict must be considered as “parties to the conflict”. The non-state groups that may consti-
tute parties have to be capable of identification as a party and have attained a certain degree of 
internal organization. This legally means that the group must possess organized armed forces, 
which are under a certain command structure and has the capacity to sustain military opera-
tions. Further, the party to a conflict must be able to observe the rules of IHL, but it is not a 
criterion that the armed group complies with the rules.111 With regard to common article 3, 
control of territory is not a requirement for an armed group to be constituted as a party to a 
non-international armed conflict. 
 
2.2.3.2 Application of Additional Protocol II Article 1 
 
Additional Protocol II applies to armed conflicts “which take place in the territory of a High 
Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized 
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as 
to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this 
Protocol.”112 As to the interpretation of the text, this provision clearly has a more limited 
scope of application that Common Article 3. The definition in APII is more restrictive and 
narrow in two aspects. First, it introduces a criterion of control over territory as a jurisdic-
tional threshold for application. Non-governmental parties must exercise such territorial con-
trol “as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to imple-
ment this Protocol”. Second, as opposed to the definition of NIAC in Common Article 3, APII 
does not apply to armed conflicts occurring between two or more non-governmental armed 
groups. 
 
This narrow definition is only relevant for the application of APII as this instrument only “de-
velops and supplements” common article 3 “without modifying its existing conditions of ap-
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plication”. Thus, the law of NIACs has not adopted the restrictive definition found in APII in 
general.  
 
The ICRC’s proposal for definition of NIAC on the basis of the analysis set out in the Opinion 
Paper which reflect the current legal view, is as follows: “Non-international armed conflicts 
are protracted armed confrontations occurring between governmental armed forces and the 
forces of one or more armed groups, or between such groups arising on the territory if a state. 
The armed confrontations must reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties involved in 
the conflict must show a minimum of organization.”113 
 
2.3 Classifying the “War on Terror” 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Whether or not a specific targeted killing is legal depends on the circumstances in which it is 
conducted.114 The international humanitarian law paradigm provides a legal framework to 
targeted killings if the state employing this strategy is considered to be in a state of an armed 
conflict with the targeted person. The law of armed conflict distinguishes targeted killing at-
tacks from acts of assassinations or extra-judicial executions.115 Nonetheless, in the new un-
traditional conflicts, the enemy does not always represent a state and categorizing the in-
volved actors and actions have thus proven to be challenging.  
 
 
2.3.2 The “War on Terror”: An “Armed Conflict”? 
 
After the attacks of 9/11, the US claimed to be engaged in a “War on Terror”. The use of tar-
geted killings of suspected terrorists has become an important and controversial part of the US 
counter-terrorism strategy and has been an officially authorized means of action by the United 
States.116 The 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) gave the president of 
the United Stated the power to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against those respon-
sible for the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.117 The US has based the 
justification for its targeted killing attacks essentially on the assertion that the United States is 
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engaged in an armed conflict with Al Qaeda and its associated forces, triggering the rules of 
IHL.118  
 
Today there is no doubt that armed groups such as Al Qaeda resort to hostilities across inter-
national frontiers. Hence, the first criterion for being an international armed conflict is satis-
fied.119 According to current IHL, in order to constitute an international armed conflict, the 
conflict must occur between two or more entities that meet the criteria of being a “party” to an 
international armed conflict, thus in principle between States.120  
 
The US holds, under the Obama administration, that they have remained in a state of non-
international armed conflict with Al Qaeda and its associates since the attacks of 9/11.121 All 
three branches of the US government have embraced this view.122 In addition, legal advisors 
and the judicial system in both the US and Israel have concluded that IHL is the international 
body of law most applicable to assessing the permissibility of targeted killings. This supports 
the view that the “War on Terror” is in fact an armed conflict triggering the rules of IHL, as 
both US and Israel assert their compliance with international standards.123 However, the US 
Government have also emphasized that although the laws of armed conflict govern this war, it 
does not constitute either an international or non-international armed conflict within the 
meaning of the Geneva Conventions, and further that  “any customary rules of international 
law that apply to armed conflict does not bind the President or the US armed forces”.124 Sev-
eral legal documents support this view.125 A memorandum by the Office of Legal Counsel of 
the US Department of Justice argues that the qualification of the war against Al Qaeda and its 
affiliates is not an international armed conflict.126 The US Department of Justice holds that 
“Non-governmental organizations cannot be parties to any of the international agreements 
here governing the laws of war”127 and that Common Article 2 is limited to situations of 
armed conflict “between two or more of the High Contracting Parties”128. 
 
                                                
118 Falk (2014), p. 299 
119 Duffy (2005) 
120 Melzer (2008), p. 248 
121 Falk (2014), p. 299; and Salinas de Frías (2012), p. 546 
122 Salinas de Frías (2012), p. 546 
123 Falk (2014), p. 299 
124 Melzer (2008), p. 263 
125 Melzer (2008), p. 263 
126 US Department of Justice (2002), p. 9 
127 US Department of Justice (2002), p. 9 
128 GC Common Article 2 
19 
 
Al Qaeda, as a non-State actor, cannot be a party to an international armed conflict. Neverthe-
less, there is no requirement that the conflict is triggered by the members of the State’s own 
armed forces. Other armed groups may execute the hostilities, provided that their use of force 
is legally attributable to the State party to the international armed conflict.129 Hence, armed 
groups or individuals cannot themselves constitute a party to an international conflict if they 
are not acting under the authority of a State.  
 
Following the attacks of 9/11, The US invaded Afghanistan as part of their counter-terrorism 
strategy. The attacks on the US carried out by Al Qaeda, a non-State armed group, were con-
sidered attributable to the Taliban government of Afghanistan. The invasion of Afghanistan 
then gave rise to an international armed conflict between the US and the Taliban government 
of Afghanistan (and its affiliates) until US-led forces overthrew the Taliban regime in 2001.130 
 
Without such State responsibility, it must be assessed whether the conflict reaches the thresh-
old of violence required to constitute a non-international armed conflict. Hence, Even though 
the US counter-terrorism strategy has lead to interstate conflicts and attacks, the “War on Ter-
ror” does not necessarily constitute an international armed conflict in the meaning of the Ge-
neva Conventions. In order for a conflict to be fall within the term “non-international armed 
conflict”, the parties to the conflict must be sufficiently identifiable and the violence must 
reach a certain threshold of intensity and duration which separates the situation from other 
forms of violence governed by the law enforcement regime.131  
 
The US Department of Defense identifies its enemy as “Al Qaeda and its affiliates” numerous 
times, e.g. in a statement by the White House regarding the legal basis for detaining Al Qaeda 
and Taliban Combatants: “The United Stated and its coalition partners are engaged in a war 
against Al Qaeda, the Taliban and their affiliates and supporters”.132 The US Government has 
further stated that there will be made no distinction between the terrorists and those who 
knowingly harbor or provide aid to them.133 Even further, the US Government holds that even 
though the “war” is in fact regulated by the rules of IHL, the conflict constitutes neither an 
international or a non-international armed conflict, and customary rules of IHL are not bind-
ing either.134 
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A “party” to a conflict must be identifiable based on objective criteria, and must thus entail a 
minimum level of organization. Hence, the concept of armed conflict must be limited to those 
situations of hostilities between sufficiently identifiable organized groups. Despite the diffi-
culties in identifying the often loosely organized armed groups in an asymmetrical conflict, 
this minimum requirement of identification must be upheld in order to avoid total arbitrariness 
in the use of force. No social phenomenon, like poverty, drug abuse and terrorism, can consti-
tute a party to an armed conflict.135  
 
2.3.3 The “War on Terror”: A Third Concept of Armed Conflict? 
 
In light of the new legal challenges in modern warfare, a subject to question is whether a new 
branch of armed conflict should arise, with new legal norms applying to the challenges of 
today. The described categories of armed conflict mentioned above are the only ones that le-
gally exist today.136 Following the 9/11 attacks, the US claimed to be engaged in a “War on 
Terror”. This challenged the abovementioned categories and evoked a controversial debate on 
whether a new kind of “transnational” armed conflict could evolve. The US Government as-
serted that the “war” is in fact governed by the rules of international humanitarian law, how-
ever it does not constitute either an IAC or a NIAC, as concluded in a memorandum by the 
Office of Legal Counsel of the US Department of Justice in 2002137. The memorandum is 
basing its conclusions on a tremendously narrow concept of NIAC, thus creating a wide gap 
between the legal concepts of international and non-international armed conflicts. Further, the 
memorandum tries to introduce a third concept: “international conflict where one of the par-
ties is not a Nation State”.138 Neither humanitarian law applicable in international armed con-
flicts, nor human rights law, nor or customary international law governs this new concept of 
armed conflict. Not even the minimum standards of humanitarian protection recognized uni-
versally as customary international law are applicable in this third type of armed conflict. 
However, it must be emphasized that, as stated by Dr. Melzer, “no conceivable cause or situa-
tion, not even an alleged “just war” against “evildoers”, could allow for an exemption from 
the peremptory norms established in humanitarian law”.139 This leads to the unconditional 
rejection of the new concept of armed conflict, brought forth by the US Government. 
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The “first” armed conflict between the Coalition forces and Taliban and its affiliates consti-
tuted an international armed conflict within the meaning if the Geneva Conventions. In inter-
national armed conflicts, there is no requirement as to the threshold. Hence, the attacks of 
9/11, attributable to the Taliban government, gave rise to an IAC between the Coalition forces 
and Taliban and its affiliates, until the Taliban regime was overthrown. The application of the 
Geneva Conventions to this IAC, was not disputed.140 The same was the case for Iraq. How-
ever, the “war on terror” extends beyond the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq comprising all 
measures of counterterrorism following the attacks of 9/11.141 Many of the counterterrorism 
operations took place within the territory of the States involved and by agents of those, like 
the CIA, as part of an armed conflict. However, a number of operations have been carried out 
in a transnational character, with the involvement of law enforcement agencies and military 
forces of several States.142  
 
A conflict between a State and a non-State organized armed group may amount to a non-
international armed conflict, given that the criteria are met.143 The criteria set forth by Com-
mon Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II renders the qualification 
of the “war on terror” challenging. Special Rapporteur Philip Alston applied these criteria to 
the conflict between the US and Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other associated forces. He con-
cludes, and I agree, that it is problematic for the US to argue that “it is in a transnational non-
international armed conflict […] without further explanation of how those entities constitute a 
‘party’ under the IHL of non-international armed conflict, and whether and how any violence 
by any such group rises to the level necessary for an armed conflict to exist.”144 International 
terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda, are known to spread fear with terrorist attacks 
around the world.145 Non-international armed conflict can exist across national borders, but 
the requirements need to be fulfilled in order to give rise to a NIAC.146 In each of those States 
who have faced the reality of terrorist attacks, the duration and intensity of such attacks must 
be assessed, and according to Alston, they have not reached the threshold of armed conflict.147 
In a large number of these situations, the terrorist attack is an isolated incident. In such cases, 
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the incident itself should be of a high degree of intensity, with a high level of organization on 
the part of the non-State armed group.148 
 
The particular conflict between the US and its allies and the Al Qaeda constitutes a non-
international armed conflict. As shown, the armed group of Al Qaeda has attained a minimal 
level of organization and the US has been able to identify its adversary as “Al Qaeda and its 
affiliates”.149 The intensity of the armed violence has indeed reached beyond the level of in-
tensity of internal disturbances and tensions.150 However, Al Qaeda and other armed groups 
with various degrees of association with it are more often than not loosely linked.151 Some 
terrorist attacks have even been carried out by a few individuals simply taking inspiration 
from Al Qaeda.152 Such “associates” of Al Qaeda cannot constitute a party to a NIAC due to 
the requirements of IHL.153 
 
A specific conflict between a State and a non-State terrorist organization may fulfill the nec-
essary criteria to constitute a non-international armed conflict, engaging the rules of IHL. The 
minimum requirements cannot be ignored. If disregarded, the safeguards of IHL against the 
use of violence against groups not equated with organized armed groups capable of being 
party to a conflict will be undermined.154 This is regardless of whether the group lacks organi-
zation, the ability to engage in armed attack, and so on. The criteria of identification and 
threshold are cumulative and both must be met in order to give rise to the existence of a 
NIAC.155 
 
In conclusion, the “war on terror” cannot constitute one transnational non-international armed 
conflict. The various situations, attacks and conflicts within “war on terror” must be assessed 
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The first prerequisite for the application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is that the 
targeted killing takes place within the context of an armed conflict. This chapter concentrates 
on the law applicable once an armed conflict has arisen. Both IHL and IHRL apply to an 
armed conflict. However, the legality of a targeted killing depends on the applicable lex spe-
cialis.156 The focus in this chapter will therefore be the rules of IHL. The objective of IHL is 
to protect persons who are not participating in the hostilities and to limit the methods and 
means of warfare. Hence, IHL imposes constraints on how an armed conflict may be con-
ducted. Among the fundamental principles of IHL that apply to an armed conflict are the op-
posing considerations of humanity and military necessity, reflected throughout the IHL. From 
these competing considerations, the principle of distinction and the principle of proportional-
ity derive, along with the prohibition on causing superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. 
These principles reflect customary international law, which are applicable to all armed con-
flicts and are binding on all states without regard as to whether or not they are parties to the 
treaties157. 
 
The focus in this provision is on the law applicable once an armed conflict has arisen. With 
regard to targeted killings of individuals, the rules of IHL determines whether the targeted 
individual is lawfully subject to direct attack, and if so, IHL provides the standards that must 
be respected when conducting such operations.158 However, there are many difficulties sur-
rounding the application of international humanitarian law to the special tactic of targeted 
killings.  
 
Targeted killings are lawful in certain circumstances. Just as with any conduct of hostilities in 
armed conflict, the legality of targeted killings depends on whether or not it is in conformity 
with the essential principles of international law governing the use of force.159 These princi-
ples are fundamental principles of customary international law. Under this legal regime, a 
state may lawfully take lives, provided that the killing is not arbitrary.  
 
Targeted killings are only legally permissible under international law when the targeted per-
son constitute a legal military objective; either a combatant, or a civilian “for such time as 
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they take direct part in hostilities.”160 Further, the lawfulness of targeted killings is subject to 
the requirement of military necessity (see chapter 3.4). Even further, the use of force is re-
quired to be proportionate in that sense that any military advantage anticipated as a result of 
the operation, must be weighed against any expected harm to civilians in the surrounding 
area, and everything feasible must be done to diminish harm to civilians (see chapter 3.5). 
These standards of the legality of targeted killings in hostilities are applicable regardless of 
whether the conflict is between States or between a State and a non-State armed group, in-
cluding alleged terrorist.161 
 
3.2 The Principle of Distinction 
 
3.2.1 Who is a Legitimate Target? 
 
Under IHL, the lawfulness of the deliberate deprivation of life depends mainly on whether or 
not the targeted person meets the criteria of a legitimate military objective. The decision of 
whether a targeted person may be legitimately attacked is governed by the principle of dis-
tinction.162 This is a fundamental principle of IHL and constitutes the basis for the rules gov-
erning armed conflict.  
 
The principle of distinction obliges belligerents to distinguish between different categories of 
persons. The primary distinction is between combatants and civilians. Combatants take part in 
the hostilities and are thus legitimate targets, as opposed to civilians not participating who are 
considered protected persons. Both conventional IHL163 and State practice is clear as to the 
rule that civilians may not be the object of direct attack, unless and for such time as they di-
rectly participate in the hostilities. API art. 51 (2) codifies the customary international law 
principle that the “civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the 
object of attack”.  
 
The two categories of individuals are mutually exclusive, which means that in an armed con-
flict, every individual is either a legitimate military objective or a protected person. Combat-
ants have the right to take part in hostilities; in other words, they cannot be prosecuted for 
their legal acts of war. Further, the adversary grants combatants prisoner of war (POW) status 
upon capture.164 On the other hand, civilians not participating in the hostilities are afforded 
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civilian protection, which mainly consists of protection from being directly targeted.165 
Hence, the protection entitles civilians is not unconditional. Civilians who take a direct part in 
the hostilities will become legitimate military targets for the duration of their participation.166 
 
In both IACs and NIACs, IHL distinguishes between the same categories of individuals. The 
protected persons are peaceful civilians, medical and religious personnel and persons hors de 
combat. A persons recognized as hors de combat comprises anyone who is in the power of an 
adverse party, anyone who is defenseless due to unconsciousness, shipwreck, wounds or sick-
ness, and anyone who clearly expresses an intention to surrender, provided that the person 
refrain from any hostile acts and does not try to escape.167 On the contrary, persons not pro-
tected against direct attack comprise members of the armed forces of a party to a conflict, 
civilians for such time as they directly participate in the hostilities, and other protected per-
sons who commit hostile acts notwithstanding the special protection granted them. 
 
Additional Protocol I protects the principle of distinction in international armed conflicts in its 
art. 48: “In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian 
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population 
and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall 
direct their operations only against military objectives.”168 Furthermore, both of the Addi-
tional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions states: “The civilian population as such, as well as 
individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack”.169 
 
As for the non-international conflicts, API does not apply. Conventional IHL conducting the 
rules in a non-international armed conflict contains few provisions on the conduct of hostili-
ties, but the main rules and principles of international armed conflict are recognized as having 
attained the status of customary international law also applicable in situations of non-
international armed conflicts. The principle of distinction is recognized as customary interna-
tional law, binding on all states170. The customary rule has been formulated by the ICRC as 
follows: “The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and com-
batants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed 
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against civilians.”171 This definition operates with a wide concept of combatants, including all 
those who are not entitled special protection. 
 
Hence, targeted killings are only lawful when employed against suspected terrorists if they are 
either deemed combatants, or civilians during ”such time” as they take “direct part in hostili-
ties”.172 The notion “direct participation in hostilities” is not defined in IHL, nor is State prac-
tice clear on the subject.173 There are two elements to the notion of direct participation in hos-
tilities; “hostilities” and “direct participation”. “Hostilities” refers to the resort to force by the 
parties to a conflict, while “direct participation” refers to the individual involvement of a ci-
vilian in these collective hostilities.174 The individual participation may be categorized as di-
rect or indirect depending on the quality and degree of the involvement in the hostilities. More 
precisely, “direct participation in hostilities” refers to specific acts carried out by individuals 
(civilians) as a part of the conduct of hostilities between parties to an armed conflict.  
 
When assessing whether a particular civilian is directly participating, hence a legitimate mili-
tary objective, the determination must be based on the person’s behavior, location, attire, and 
other relevant information available at the time.175 The ICTY stated in the Tadic case that it is 
“unnecessary to define exactly the line dividing those taking an active part in hostilities and 
those who are not so involved. It is sufficient to examine the relevant facts of each victim and 
the ascertain whether, in each individual’s circumstances, that person was actively involved in 
hostilities at the relevant time.176 
 
Simply participating in hostilities does not necessarily constitute as direct participation.177 In 
order for a specific act to qualify as “direct participation in hostilities”, rendering the individ-
ual targetable, three cumulative criteria must be met.178 Firstly the act must be likely to ad-
versely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to the armed conflict, or 
the act must be likely to inflict death, injury, or destruction on protected persons or objects 
(threshold of harm).179 Secondly, there must be a direct causal link between the act and the 
harm likely to result either from that specific act, or from a military operation in which the 
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specific act is considered an integral part (direct causation).180 Lastly, there must be belliger-
ent nexus between the act and the hostilities conducted between the parties to an armed con-
flict (belligerent nexus).181 In other words, the act must be designed to directly cause the re-
quired threshold of harm in support a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another. 
Only when all three elements are satisfies may an act be rendered as “direct participation”. 
 
When in doubt as to whether an individual is a civilian or a combatant, art. 50 (1) of API 
states that the person “shall be considered to be a civilian”.182 
 
3.2.2 Organized Armed Groups in NIACs 
 
There are two main categories of individuals in armed conflict, namely combatants and civil-
ians. Even though the treaty law governing the rules of NIAC contains only a few rules on the 
conduct of hostilities, many of the key rules and principles applicable in IACs have attained 
customary status, also applicable in NIACs.183 
 
For the purposes of the principle of distinction in IACs, the concept of combatants is defined 
in API art. 43 and 50 and GCIII art. 4 as all persons who are members of armed forces party 
to the conflict.184 The ICRC has formulated the customary rule defining “civilians” in its rule 
5: “Civilians are persons who are not members of the armed forces.”185 Hence, all other per-
sons are considered civilians entitled to protection against direct attack, unless they take part 
in the hostilities rendering them targetable for such time as they directly participate. 
 
Due to the lack of definitions of the terms “civilian”, “armed forces” and “organized armed 
groups” in treaty law governing NIACs, they must be “interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to them in their context and in the light of the object 
and purpose of IHL”.186 It is generally recognized that members of State armed forces are 
combatants. The ICRC Study on Customary IHL confirms this view.187 The organized armed 
groups of a non-State party, however, do not qualify as regular armed forces. The notion 
“armed forces” appears frequently in conventional IHL. A question that arises is whether this 
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concept includes only State armed forces or if the functional organized armed groups who 
conduct hostilities on behalf of a party in a NIAC are also covered by the notion. Within the 
meaning of Common Article 3, the ICRC Commentary states: “Speaking generally, it must be 
recognized that the conflicts referred to in Article 3 are armed conflicts, with ‘armed forces’ 
in either side engaged in ‘hostilities’”.188 Furthermore, a NIAC within the meaning of this 
provision can occur between opposing non-State parties, as it has no requirement of the 
involvement of a State. Hence, the conclusion is that the notion of “armed forces” in Common 
Article 3 comprises armed forces of both State and non-State parties to a NIAC. 
 
APII art. 1 (1) is applicable only to conflicts arising between the armed forces of a “High 
Contracting Party” on one side, and “dissident armed forces” or “other organized armed 
groups” on the other.189 This article does not differentiate between the parties to the conflict 
and its armed forces. However, when otherwise referred to throughout IHL, it seems that “or-
ganized armed group” is equated with “armed forces”, not with a party to the conflict as a 
whole. Hence, in line with the terminological and conceptual approach of both conventional 
and customary IHL, the notion of “organized armed groups” in Article 1 (1) should be 
equated with the fighting forces of a non-State actor party to the conflict.190 The categoriza-
tion of the individuals and the consequences for membership in each category is the same in 
both Common Article 3 and APII art. 1 (1), despite the narrow scope of application of APII. 
 
Common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions oblige “each Party to the conflict” to grant pro-
tection against arbitrary exercise of power to “persons taking no active part in the hostilities, 
including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de 
combat”.191 According to this passage, both State and non-State parties to a NIAC must dis-
tinguish between members of the armed forces and civilians not participating. The persons 
afforded protection thus comprises all persons who do not directly participate in the hostilities 
on behalf of a party. 
 
The ICRC Study on customary IHL states that “practice is ambiguous as to whether members 
of armed opposition groups are considered members of armed forces or civilians” and empha-
sizes that “most manuals define civilian negatively with respect to combatants and armed 
forces, and are silent on the status of armed opposition groups”192. According to the ICRC 
Interpretive Guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities under international 
                                                
188 ICRC Commentary to the GCIII, p. 37 
189 Melzer (2008), p. 315 
190 Melzer (2008), pp. 315-316 
191 Common Artice 3 to the GCs 
192 Melzer (2008), p. 316; and ICRC (2005), pp. 17 and 19 
29 
 
humanitarian law, organized armed groups constitute the armed forces of a non-State party 
and thus consists of individuals whose continuous function is to take direct part in the hostili-
ties; “continuous combat function”.193 A question that needs to be answered is whether the 
members of such non-State armed groups are considered civilians continuously participating 
directly in the hostilities, or whether they are considered combatants.  
 
 
The terms “combatants” and “civilians” are not clearly defined in the regulations of the con-
duct of hostilities in non-international armed conflicts, and according to the ICRC Study prac-
tice is vague as to characterizing the members of armed groups as either combatants or civil-
ians.194 More precisely, the practice is not clear on whether the members of organized armed 
groups are considered civilians who directly participate in the hostilities, rendering them tar-
getable only for such time as they are directly participating, or whether these members are 
combatants (and thus continuously liable to attack). An additional possibility is that such 
membership alone in an organized armed group is enough to constitute ”direct participation”. 
 
However, according to Melzer, and I agree with his point of view, the ambiguous practice 
submitted in the ICRC Study is not in fact reflected in State practice.195 It is highly unlikely 
that a State engaged in a non-international armed conflict against a non-State actor would give 
any kind of recognition of such armed groups or give any kind of statement that could be in-
terpreted in that way.196 Hence, the status of the individual members of organized armed 
groups is not expressly regulated in military manuals, as well as in conventional IHL, but this 
lack of formal regulation does not equate vague practice. Therefore, the relevant State practice 
as to the qualification of armed groups as civilians or combatants must therefore be inter-
preted through operational conduct, indirect statements and absence of condemnation.197 If 
States were to consider the members of organized armed groups as civilians, they would have 
to express, through statements and general conduct, that organized armed groups cannot be 
attacked unless and for such time as they directly participate in the hostilities.198 If States then 
attacked such armed groups outside a military operation, it would be considered unlawful. 
However, in both past and current non-international armed conflicts, States armed forces have 
not been reluctant to directly attack the opposing armed group also when it is not engaged in a 
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specific military operation.199 Such attacks are normally not denied by the attacking State nor 
has other States or expressed disapproval of them. There is little or no doubt as to the permis-
sibility of such attacks. In the event an attack has been internationally condemned it is based 
on different allegations, either that it has caused too extensive collateral damage, or that the 
attacked individuals was not part of the fighting forces of the non-State party to the conflict. 
In conclusion, members of organized armed groups are not considered civilians. 
 
When implementing the fundamental principle, the distinction must be based on the reasona-
bly dependable information available at the time.200 When determining whether an individual 
constitutes a lawful military objective in a specific situation in a NIAC, it must first be made 
clear whether the person is a civilian, a combatant, or an individual otherwise afforded special 
protection against direct attack. Secondly, if the individual is a protected person, it must be 
assessed whether this individual does not directly participate in the hostilities, or if he or she 
does so sporadically on an unorganized, spontaneous basis, leaving him/her unprotected for 
such time as the hostile act takes place.201 
 
Organized armed groups mostly recruit their members from the civilian population, but they 
have reached certain a level of military organization enabling them to conduct hostilities on 
behalf of a party to a conflict. These armed groups make up the functional armed forces of a 
non-State actor party to a non-international armed conflict. This distinction is significant due 
to the consequences of membership in such an armed group, in contrast to other types of asso-
ciation with a non-State party.202 
 
The determination of membership in organized armed groups is complicated, as it has no ba-
sis in domestic law.203 Membership in these informally structured armed groups is hardly ever 
formalized and membership is seldom expressed through uniforms or other forms of identifi-
cation. Affiliation with a non-State party to a conflict, especially with regard to terrorist orga-
nizations, may also depend on abstract affiliation, e.g. family ties, that do not automatically 
lead to membership within the meaning of IHL.204 Under IHL, the significant criterion for 
membership in such organized armed groups is that the membership must derive from an in-
dividual taking up a continuous function in the group and whether or not this function in-
cludes activities amounting to direct participation in the conduct of hostilities on behalf of a 
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non-State actor.205 In the ICRCs Interpretive guidance it is stated that this continuous combat 
function does not entitle the fighters to combatant privilege, but that it distinguishes members 
of the organized armed forces of a non-State party from those civilians who spontaneously 
and sporadically directly participates in the hostilities, and from those who assume non-
combat functions.206 Hence, according to the Interpretive Guidance, the members of the orga-
nized group in question are required to perform a “continuous combat function” before they 
qualify as individuals who may be attacked on the basis of membership.207 The Interpretive 
Guidance holds that this function is synonymous with direct participation, which means that 
the persons subject to attack are those members whose function is to engage in the hostilities 
in a way that would rise to the level of direct participation, however, they do not have to be 
engaged in these activities at the time of attack.208 
 
Further, a terrorist organization that constitutes a non-State party to a conflict operates not 
only through military operations, but they are often active in cultural, political and religious 
contexts as well. This, together with the informal structure and the vague, ambiguous mem-
bership, makes it exceptionally difficult to make a clear distinction between the non-State 
party to the non-international armed conflict and its functional armed forces. Those individu-
als affiliated with an organized armed group, who may accompany them and provide support 
to a party to the conflict, do not obtain membership of the armed group without assuming 
functions that amount to direct participation in the hostilities.209 These individuals do not as-
sume “continuous combat function” and will benefit from the protection granted them as ci-
vilians.210  
 
The ICRC Interpretive Guidance concludes that all persons not members of State armed 
forces or organized armed groups of a party to the conflict are civilians.211 Further, organized 
armed groups constitute the armed forces of a non-State party to the NIAC and consist of in-
dividuals whose continuous function is to take direct part in hostilities (“continuous combat 
function”).  
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However, Akande212 and Schmitt213 both criticize the term “continuous combat function” 
brought forth by the ICRC Interpretive Guidance, and I agree with their criticism. According 
to the Interpretive Guidance, the members of an organized armed group who have a continu-
ous combat function may be attacked at any time, while those who only periodically and spo-
radically directly participate, must be treated as civilians rendered targetable only for such 
time as they actually directly participate in the hostilities. Schmitt holds that this distinction 
will be impractical and difficult in practice.214 As addressed above, the determination of 
whether an individual is a legal target or not depends on the reliable information available. 
Hence, if a specific individual is identified once as having engaged in hostilities, how may the 
targeting State know whether this participation was merely periodic when carrying out a sub-
sequent operation against the organized armed group?215  
 
Further, applying the requirement of “continuous combat function” is not in compliance with 
the military necessity-humanitarian balance of IHL.216 While membership in regular armed 
forces alone is sufficient to render the members as permissible targets at all times, even when 
the targeted person has no functions that could rise to the level of direct participation, this is 
not the case for members of organized armed groups. When applying the criterion of “con-
tinuous combat function” to the members of organized armed groups, the result is the preclu-
sion of targeting and attacking these members, despite the certainty as to membership.217 
Hence, this distinction between the members of the armed forces of a State and of the armed 
forces of non-State groups results in a lack of equality.218 In regular armed forces, all mem-
bers are legitimate military targets, regardless of their functions, while in organized armed 
forces, those who assume non-combat functions does not constitute a legitimate military ob-
jective and cannot be targeted. Schmitt provides a good illustration on this point: “a cook in 
the regular armed forces may be lawfully attacked at any time; his or her counterpart in an 
organized armed group may be attacked only if he or she directly participates and then only 
for such time as the participation occurs”.219 
 
The ICRC base the justification for the application of the criterion “continuous combat func-
tion” on a concern about the inability to make a distinction between members of an armed 
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group and civilians and/or civilians with an affiliation to the group.220 However, when in 
doubt as to whether an individual is a civilian or a combatant, art. 50 (1) of API states that the 
person “shall be considered to be a civilian”.221 I agree with Akande and Schmitt in their criti-
cism. In addition, the fact that the rules of IHL apply with equal force to all belligerents222 is 
an argument as to why the rules of targeting should also be similar, irrespective of whether the 
armed forces are State’s armed forces or non-State armed forces. 
 
In modern wars, which no longer stay within the boundaries of a battlefield, often with both 
civilians and combatants on the ground, the classification of individuals is not always an easy 
task. The main question at hand is whether the terrorists, as individuals being part of a non-
State armed group in a non-international armed conflict, are considered as civilians or com-
batants. As the preceding analysis has shown, the categorization of the functional armed 
forces of a party to the conflict as “State armed forces” or “organized armed groups” is ulti-
mately irrelevant.  
 
In conclusion, with regard to the classification of individuals in the war on terror, the legality 
of targeting the individual terrorist depend in a large scale on whether or not he or she is a 
member of an organized armed group to the conflict. As addressed above, members of the 
armed forces of a non-State party to a NIAC are combatants, regardless of their function 
within the armed force. Hence, if the targeted person is member of the armed forces of a party 
to the conflict, he or she constitutes a legitimate military target. Terrorists outside such orga-
nized armed groups, who operate alone or not under a command in sufficiently organized 
forms, are considered civilians. Hence, it must be assessed whether the person fulfills the cri-
teria of direct participation in the hostilities, and if so, the individual may be lawfully targeted 
for such time as he or she directly participates. 
 
3.3 The Principle of Necessity 
 
The targeted killings carried out under the paradigm of hostilities must be in accordance with 
the requirement of necessity.223 The principle of necessity constitutes a core principle in IHL, 
and it is considered customary international law.224 This long-established principle of IHL 
requires that the military action, including the type and degree of used force, must be neces-
sary for the achievement of a legitimate military purpose. In other words, belligerent may 
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only apply the amount and type of force necessary to defeat the enemy.225 An act of war is 
only lawful when directed against military objectives, as addressed above in chapter 3.2, pro-
vided that the operation is not likely to cause unnecessary suffering (see chapter 3.6) and that 
it is not perfidious (the use of treacherous means and methods).226  
 
IHL is a compromise between military and humanitarian requirements and its rules thus com-
ply with both military necessity and the considerations of humanity.227 Hence, the principle of 
necessity has two aspects: the permissive aspect and the restrictive aspect.228 The first permits 
States to employ the kind and degree of force necessary to defeat the opposing belligerent 
with a minimum expenditure of time, life and physical resources, which is not otherwise pro-
hibited by the rules of IHL. The latter restrain the sum total of lawful military actions by pro-
hibiting acts which are not otherwise unlawful, as long as they are not necessary for the 
achievement of a legitimate military goal.229 With regard to targeted killings, a targeted killing 
that is illegal under IHL cannot be defended by considerations of military necessity.230 In 
other words, military necessity can never justify departing from the rules of IHL to gain a 
military advantage, e.g. by using forbidden means.231 Conversely, even when a targeted kill-
ing is otherwise permissible under IHL, it is unlawful when there is no military necessity in 
the specific circumstances of that targeted killing.232  
 
In conclusion, the principle of military necessity requires that the killing of the targeted indi-
vidual effectively contributes to the targeting State gaining a concrete and direct military ad-
vantage. In addition, considerations of military necessity cannot justify an otherwise unlawful 
targeted killing. 
 
3.4 The Principle of Proportionality 
 
The lawfulness of the targeted killing of an individual is subject to the requirement of propor-
tionality.233 Hence, military necessary targeted killings of legitimate military objectives must 
also comply with the principle of proportionality.234 The principle of proportionality is con-
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sidered customary international humanitarian law applicable in both IACs and NIACs.235 The 
customary rule has been formulated by the ICRC as follows: “Launching an attack which may 
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian ob-
jects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and di-
rect military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.”236 Hence, the requirement of proportional-
ity prohibits the targeted killing of a person subject to lawful attack if the collateral damage is 
expected to be excessive compared to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage 
gained by the killing of that individual.237  
 
In the absence of a battlefield, civilians and combatants often live side by side. This is one of 
the challenges of asymmetric warfare. The question in this regard is whether saving the poten-
tially threatened lives is proportional with the deprivation of the right to life of the collateral 
victims.238 In other words, the requirement of proportionality weighs the importance of the 
anticipated military advantage against the severity of the expected collateral damage of peace-
ful bystanders.239 When no such collateral damage is expected, there is no need for an assess-
ment of proportionality. On the other hand, any targeted killing likely to cause excessive col-
lateral damage is prohibited regardless of the lawfulness otherwise.240 
 
The proportionality of a targeted killing causing collateral damage depends on the relative 
military importance of the target (military target value).241 Hence, “high value” targets justify 
a larger collateral damage than “low value” targets. The targeted individuals rank, operational 
function and tactical position at the time of the targeting are factors that must be assessed 
when deciding the value of a target.242 An example, a military leader may be a “high value” 
target, but only for as long as he or she assumes the leader position in the armed group party 
to the conflict. Hence, each operation of targeted killings require a separate proportionality 
evaluation. Further, the anticipated concrete and military advantage obtained from a targeted 
killing must be assessed from the perspective of the only legitimate purpose in armed con-
flicts, namely to weaken and defeat the enemy.243 The killing of an enemy is not considered 
purpose itself, the operation must be carried out with a view to progressing the military effort 
against the enemy, with the aim to end the conflict. 
                                                
235 Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law (2005), rule 14 
236 Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law (2005), rule 14 
237 Melzer (2008), p. 404 
238 Perisic (2014), p. 100 
239 Melzer (2008), p. 404 
240 Melzer (2008), p. 404 
241 Melzer (2008), p. 404 
242 Melzer (2008), p. 404 




3.5 Lawful Methods and Means of Warfare 
 
One of the fundamental aims of IHL is to protect the civilian population, as well as combat-
ants, against excessive and exceptionally cruel violence.244 The right to choose methods and 
means of warfare in an armed conflict is not unlimited.245 The principle of limited warfare 
(limited to what is military absolutely necessary in order to achieve the military objectives246) 
expresses concisely the customary principle that any act of warfare should be guided by the 
requirements of military necessity. This is one of the core principles of IHL derived from es-
tablished custom, from the principles of humanity, and from dictates of public conscience.247 
It is prohibited to employ means and methods which are intended or of a nature to cause su-
perfluous injury or unnecessary suffering248, to injure military objectives, civilians and other 
protected persons or civilian objects without distinction249 and to cause widespread, long-
term, and/or severe damage to the natural environment250. Hence, certain weapons are re-
stricted or prohibited.251  
 
Further, it is prohibited to kill an adversary by resort to perfidy.252 This is part of customary 
international law applicable in IACs and NIACs.253 This is relevant to targeted killings be-
cause the element of surprise is often crucial for a successful operation. If a State employs 
soldiers in plain clothes to operate a targeted killing, this is a feigning of civilian, non-
combatant status for the purpose of killing an adversary and it thus amounts to perfidy.254 Un-




A suspected terrorist may lawfully be the victim of a targeted killing if he or she is a member 
of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, or if he or she directly participates in the hostili-
ties. Further, the killing of that particular terrorist must be necessary for the achievement of a 
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legitimate military purpose. In addition, the military target value of that terrorist must be pro-
portionate in relation to the anticipated collateral damage caused by the operation. As to the 
“War on Terror” and US sponsored targeted killings, an assessment is conducted prior to the 
operation of whether the intelligence supports and validates the choice of target, examining 
the target location and purpose, as well as the potential collateral damage and intelligence 
gain and loss.255 In addition, targets are assessed in terms of their military importance and in 
line with compliance with military objectives and the rules of IHL.256 In conclusion, a tar-
geted killing is only permissible under IHL when employed against a lawful military target, 
provided that the killing of that individual contributes effectively to the achievement of a con-
crete and military advantage proportionate to the expected collateral damage. 
 




Targeted killings raise sovereignty concerns when conducted within the territory of other 
States.257 The UN Charter art 2(4) prohibits the use of armed force and forbids States from 
using force in the territory of another. This provision reads: “All Members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of 
the United Nations.”258 The general view is that art. 2(4) aims to restrict the first resort to 
armed force by a state or states, unless it can be justified by the exceptions. Whether a tar-
geted killing violates the sovereignty of a State or not, is determined by the law governing 
inter-state force, whereas the legality of the particular targeted killing is governed by 
IHL/IHRL.259  
 
The specific targeted killing conducted by one State in the territory of another State does not 
necessarily violate the second State’s sovereignty. The sovereignty is not violated only if the 
targeted State consents to the targeted killing or if the targeting State has the right to resort to 
armed force, either under art. 51 of the UN Charter due to the exercise of individual or collec-
tive self-defense, or under art. 39-42, which states that use of force is justified when author-
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ized by the Security Council.260 Hence, without consent, the right to resort to self-defense 
only legitimizes the targeted killing in the event that the targeted State is responsible for an 
armed attack on the targeting State.261  
 
It is not legally controversial that a State may consent to another State using force on its terri-
tory.262 However, the consenting State’s obligations to protect those within their jurisdiction 
applies at all times, thus, the consent does not relieve the States in question from their duty to 
abide by the rules of IHL and IHRL when using force against an individual.263 Hence, the 
consenting State cannot authorize a targeted killing unless the targeted killing operation is in 
accordance with the applicable law (IHL/IHRL).264  
 
Without such consent, the States right to self-defense may justify an extraterritorial targeted 
killing. It is lawful under international law for a State to use lethal force in self-defense as 
response to an “armed attack” provided that the used force is both proportionate and neces-
sary.265 In the context of self-defense, the targeted killing must be proportionate to the “armed 
attack”. The use of force is necessary when used defensively and as long as it is restricted to 
the objective.  
 
4.2 Self-Defense Against Non-State Actors 
 
The question that arises, in the context of targeted killings in the “War on Terror”, is whether 
it is permitted under art. 51 of the UN Charter for States to use force against non-State actors. 
This question arises due to the fact that the targeted individual will often be a member of a 
non-State organized armed group party to a non-international armed conflict, see chapter 2.3.  
The ICJ found in the Wall Advisory Opinion that art. 51 cannot be invoked by a State as self-
defense against armed attack by non-State actors whose activities do not engage the responsi-
bility of a State266. The Court holds that “Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the exis-
tence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against an-
other State. However, Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a for-
eign State.”267 The Court consequently concludes that art. 51 has no relevance in that present 
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case.268 On the contrary, some States have argued that art. 51 has not displaced the customary 
right to act in self-defense, including against non-State actors.269 Support for the latter argu-
ment is found in Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, both adapted in September 
2001 in the aftermath of 9/11. NATO also supports this view by stating in a press release on 
September 12th, 2001, that the attacks of 9/11 “shall be regarded as an action covered by Arti-
cle 5 of the Washington Treaty”, invoking Article 5 for the first time in history.270 Article 5 
provides that if a party to NATO is the victim of armed attack, the other members will take 
the actions it deems necessary to assist the attacked State. This is the principle of collective 
self-defense.271 Hence, with this statement, NATO does not only support the view that art. 51 
may be invoked against non-State actors, but it also defines the attacks of 9/11 as an “armed 
attack”.  
 
This leads me to address the question concerning the threshold for the types of attacks that 
may justify the extraterritorial use of force in self-defense. More precisely, whether terrorist 
attacks by non-State actors constitutes an “armed attack” within the meaning of art. 51. The 
ICJ has established a high threshold for armed attacks, holding that sporadic, discrete attacks 
do not reach the threshold required for permitting the right to use extraterritorial force in self-
defense.272 Further, the legality of a defensive response to an “armed attack” must be assessed 
with regard to each armed attack, not by considering occasional armed attacks combined.273 
 
As to the “War on Terror”, which started after the attacks of 9/11, the question that arises is 
whether these attacked reached the threshold for constituting an armed attack. As stated 
above, the high threshold established by the ICJ excludes sporadic and low-intensity attacks 
from the notion of “armed attack” in art. 51. Due to limited time and space I will not go deep 
into this assessment. Briefly, the four coordinated terrorist attacks of 9/11 carried out by Al 
Qaeda, resulted in the loss of almost 3000 lives and damage for several billion dollars.274 In 
my view, these attacks will undoubtedly rise to the level of “armed attack”, justifying the ex-
traterritorial use of force by the US following the attacks.   
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4.3 Anticipatory and Pre-Emptive Self-Defense 
 
The right to self-defense may be exercised not only in response to an armed attack, but it may 
be permissible to invoke the right in advance providing that the defensive operation meets 
certain criteria. The legality of anticipatory self-defense, or the use of force as a pre-emptive 
measure in response to a continual threat that may manifest in the future, is a controversial 
topic. If interpreted strictly, art. 51 does not give permission for States to invoke the right to 
self-defense before an attack has occurred. In a more liberal view reflecting State practice, the 
right to self-defense comprises the right to use force against a threat before an actual attack 
has taken place, provided that it is a real and imminent threat when “the necessity of that self-
defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of delib-
eration”.275 The US has invoked that the use of force is permitted as “pre-emptive self-
defense”, which is the use of force even in a situation of a threat that is not imminent and un-
certainty as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack remains.276 However, this view is in-




In the preceding analysis, I have found that in the absence of consent, the use of targeted kill-
ings as a measure of self-defense employed against members of non-State armed groups is 
permissible when the preceding attack reaches the threshold of “armed attack” in art. 51. 
However, the targeted killing must comply with the applicable law (IHL/IHRL), which is de-
termined by the circumstances in which it takes place. 
 
 




In the absence of an armed conflict, the legal body that applies to targeted killings is interna-
tional human rights law. In the situations of targeted killings happening outside the context of 
an armed conflict, the question is whether these targeted killings violate the human rights 
standards. The key human right that is challenged in relation to targeted killings is the right to 
life set out in art. 6 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
                                                
275 UN Human Rights Council (2010), p. 15 
276 UN Human Rights Council (2010), p. 15 
277 UN Human Rights Council (2010), p. 15 
41 
 
and in art. 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Art. 6 (1) reads as fol-
lows: “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. 
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”278 As mentioned above, when a State is in 
position to carry out a targeted killing outside its jurisdiction, it is also in a position to assume 
legal responsibility for not respecting the conventional right to life of the targeted person.279 
On the other hand, whether a State is under an obligation to actively protect the right to life of 
persons outside its territorial jurisdiction depends on the level of control actually exercised 
over the specific territory or person.280 
 
Most scholars that consider targeted killings as impermissible also view the “War on Terror” 
not to be an armed conflict. Hence, their view is that terrorism should be governed by crimi-
nal law, which means that officers cannot use lethal force unless lives are in immediate dan-
ger and that the deprivation of life is solely a manner of last resort.281 For those states that 
practice targeted killings as a strategy of counter-terrorism, international humanitarian law 
would be the favorable choice of law. During an armed conflict, IHL is lex specialis and the 
prohibition on the deprivation of life set out in ICCPR art. 6 has to be interpreted in light of 
the more permissible rules for taking lives that prevail in situations of an armed conflict282. 
Hence, IHL provides a more liberal regime for the use of lethal force against individuals than 
the generally applicable rules of IHRL, where targeted killings would primarily be a measure 
of last resort.283  
 
Outside the context of an armed conflict, a targeted killing may only be legally permissible 
when it is required to protect human life and there are no other means are available capable of 
preventing the threat.284 The ICJ has recognized the prohibition of murder and extrajudicial 
execution as a non-derogable rule of international law in the Nicaragua case.285 In addition, 
the UN Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and 
numerous international law experts, have also confirmed this peremptory nature of the right to 
life.286 Hence, the right to life is today undeniably part of jus cogens.287 However, under 
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ICCPR art. 6 no individual shall be “arbitrarily” deprived of his life.288 Hence, the deprivation 
of the life of an individual is not considered as murder or extrajudicial execution unless it ar-
bitrary or otherwise prohibited by international law.289  
 
Hence, the protection of individuals against deprivation of life set forth in ICCPR and ECHR 
in not absolute.290 Only “arbitrary” deprivation of life is prohibited. Hence, the lawfulness of 
extra-judicial killings of individuals by State agents depends on the interpretation of the term 
“arbitrary”. The term is not defined in ICCPR. However, the UN Human Rights Committee, 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights have set four standards of 
“arbitrariness”.291 Firstly, the deprivation of life is “arbitrary” when lethal force is used with-
out legal basis. Secondly, it is “arbitrary” when caused by force exceeding what is necessary 
to maintain, restore, or impose, law and order in the circumstances of the particular case (see 
chapter 5.2). Thirdly, the deprivation of life is “arbitrary” when the force used is dispropor-
tionate to the actual present threat or danger (see chapter 5.3). Lastly, it is “arbitrary” when it 
could be avoided by taking reasonable precautionary measures, or if it is not proceeded by a 
warning or the opportunity to surrender, or if the deprivation of life is based merely on the 
suspicion that the individual in question may be involved in a threat.292 
 
In the US National Security Strategy of 2015, the US President holds that “outside of areas of 
active hostilities, we endeavor to detain, interrogate, and prosecute terrorists through law en-
forcement. However, when there is a continuing, imminent threat, and when capture or other 
actions to disrupt the threat are not feasible, we will not hesitate to take decisive action. We 
will always do so legally, discriminately, proportionally, and bound by strict accountability 
and strong oversight.”293 
 
In conclusion, whether a deprivation of life is arbitrary depends on the circumstances that 
prevail in each case.294 More precisely, IHRL requires that any use of lethal force is propor-
tionate to the legitimate aim of safeguarding life and that deprivation of life is a necessary 
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measure with no other available means to address the threat. Hence, in exceptional circum-
stances, it is conceivable that targeted killings are justifiable under IHRL.295 
 
5.2 Requirement of Absolute Necessity 
 
Under the requirement of absolute necessity, the use of lethal force is only permitted as a 
manner of last resort. In other words, there must be no other non-lethal means available to 
address the threat in question. Hence, the requirement of necessity obliges the State exercising 
the killing to minimize the use of force through warnings, capture, etc. 
 
There are three elements to the requirement of necessity, namely the aspects of qualitative, 
quantitative and temporal necessity.296 As to the qualitative aspect, a deprivation of life is 
“arbitrary” if the potentially lethal force is used when it was not “strictly unavoidable” or 
“strictly necessary” to protect any person from imminent death or serious injury.297 Hence, all 
other means must be ineffective and a targeted killing cannot be qualitatively necessary if the 
aim of the operation can be achieved by other means than lethal force.298 The aspect of quanti-
tative necessity implies that the deprivation of life is “arbitrary” when the used lethal force 
was extensive compared to what is necessary to achieve a legitimate aim.299 Therefore, a tar-
geted killing is only quantitatively necessary for the achievement of the desired purpose when 
it is insufficient to merely incapacitate the targeted person by potentially lethal force.300 In 
other words, in order for a targeted killing to be lawful, the force used may or may not have 
lethal consequences. Hence, it must be objectively indispensable to intentionally kill the tar-
geted individual.301 Lastly, the deprivation of life is “arbitrary” when it is caused by force 
directed at a person who does not yet or no longer represent a threat (temporal aspect).302  
 
In conclusion, the requirement of absolute necessity require that targeted killings comply with 
the exceptionally strict standards of necessity in the three aspects shown above. 
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5.3 Requirement of Proportionality 
 
The issue of proportionality arises regardless of which rules are applicable to a specific tar-
geted killing.303 Hence, under IHRL it is required that any use of lethal force is proportionate 
to the legitimate aim of safeguarding life. As opposed to the requirement of proportionality 
within the context of hostilities, where the assessment regards the “collateral damage” in-
flicted on civilians, the assessment outside the context of armed conflict involves a value 
judgment independent from considerations of necessity.304 In this regard, the requirement of 
proportionality limits the acceptable intensity of force to an amount that is proportionate 
based on the posed threat. Even when the use of lethal force is necessary to remove the threat, 
as addressed above, it is not lawful to use lethal force if the expected harm is disproportionate 
compared to the gravity of the threat.305 
 
A specific proportionate assessment must be made with regard to the circumstances prevailing 
in each case.306 In general, potentially lethal force may only be used to defend any person 
against an imminent threat of death or serious injury, or to prevent the perpetration of a excep-
tionally serious crime involving serious threat to life, or to arrest a person presenting such a 
danger and who resist arrest, or to prevent the escape of that person.307 The intentional use of 
lethal force is a more severe measure. The use of lethal force with the intent to kill is only 
considered proportionate where strictly unavoidable for the protection of human life from 
unlawful attack.308  
 
In conclusion, the requirement of proportionality prohibits States to resort to targeted killings 





In the absence of an armed conflict, targeted killings must be assessed under the international 
normative paradigm of law enforcement and international human rights law. The preceding 
analysis has shown that the use of lethal force outside the conduct of hostilities is only per-
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missible in exceptional circumstances. Hence, the legal framework does not prohibit targeted 
killings categorically, but it imposes strict restrains on the method of targeted killings.309  
 
For a targeted killing to be permissible under IHRL, it must have a sufficient legal basis in 
domestic law regulating the use of force in accordance with international law. In addition, it 
must be of exclusively preventive nature and the aim must exclusively be to protect human 
life from unlawful attack. Further, it must be of absolutely qualitative, quantitative and tempo-
ral necessary for the achievement of the purpose. Lastly, it must be a matter of last resort, the 
killing cannot be the actual aim of an operation which is planned, prepared and conducted as 
to minimize, to the greatest extent possible, the recourse to lethal force.310 
 
The killing of an individual cannot be the sole purpose of the operation, unless it is strictly 
unavoidable to save human life from unlawful attack. The targeted killing must remain as a 
measure of last resort, in other words, the inevitable consequence of the operation. In other 
words, it is not permissible to target and kill an individual if this is the sole objective of the 
operation without absolute certainty that if not killed, human life will suffer gravely. This 
leads me to the conclusion that targeted killings in general, as a deliberate, calculated and in-
tended killing, cannot be legally permissible outside of an armed conflict. Only extreme situa-





In this thesis I have found that the international lex lata provides a merely satisfactory, regula-
tory framework for targeted killings carried out by States as part of their counterterrorism 
strategy. The rules of international humanitarian law provide a more permissible set of rules 
for governing this counterterrorism strategy than the rules of international human rights law 
solely.   
 
In the context of an armed conflict, a targeted killing of a suspected terrorist may indeed be 
carried out lawfully, provided that the targeted individual is a combatant in the fighting forces 
of a party to the conflict, and that the operation is both necessary and proportionate. In addi-
tion, no unlawful means and methods of warfare may be used. I have found that terrorists in 
organized armed groups are combatants, and may therefore be lawfully targeted. 
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Outside the context of armed conflict, targeted killings cannot be carried out lawfully due to 
the nature of targeted killings, except in exceptional circumstances. The deprivation of life is 
only justifiable as a matter of last resort, and hence, the aim of the operation cannot be to kill. 
Hence, targeted killings as a deliberate, calculated and intended killing, cannot be legally 
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